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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State in this case has appealed the district court's order dismissing the
State's information.

The district court granted Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss the

State's information based on the court's determination that the State had not presented
sufficient evidence to establish the requisite intent and knowledge elements for the
charge of video voyeurism.

On appeal, the State does not advance any of the

arguments that were raised before the district court, but instead claims for the first time
on appeal that the district court erred in not applying an alternate theory of criminal
liability for video voyeurism than that actually alleged by the State with regard to the
court's review of whether probable cause existed for the charged offense.
Mr. McLellan submits that the State has not demonstrated that the district court
abused its discretion. First, the State presents no legal authority to support its position
that a court is obligated to seek out any possible theory of criminal liability that has not
been alleged by the State in rendering its probable cause determination. Rather, the
language of I.C.R. 5.1 and case law regarding probable cause determinations require
that probable cause be established for every element of the offense charged by the
State. Mr. McLellan submits that, in light of this language, the magistrate's probable
cause determination must be made with regard to the manner in which the offense has
been charged by the State, and that the reviewing court is not obligated to seek out
alternative theories of criminal liability than those actually charged by the criminal
complaint.
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Second, even if the courts were permitted to seek out alternate theories of
criminal liability in reviewing whether there exists probable cause for the charged
offense, the State in this case presented insufficient evidence to support a finding as to
any intent on the part of Mr. McLellan at the time the images of N.N. 1 were obtained.
The video at issue was never presented to either the magistrate or the district court,
there was no evidence as to the surrounding circumstances regarding the obtaining of
the images contained within this video, and the sole descriptions of the videotaped
images only established that N.N. removed her clothing in front of the camera.
Mr. McLellan submits that, under any theory of liability under I.C. § 18-6609, the State's
evidence was insufficient to establish any of the requisite intents to support the State's
allegation of video voyeurism.
Accordingly, Mr. McLellan submits that the State has not demonstrated any
abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in granting his motion to dismiss the
State's information based upon the failure to establish probable cause as to every
element of the charged offense.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State in this case filed a criminal complaint against Mr. McLellan that alleged
that he had committed the offense of video voyeurism.

(R., pp.5-6.) Specifically, the

Complaint alleged that Mr. McLellan had committed this offense as follows:
That the Defendant, CHRIS J MCLELLAN, on or between 2/1/10 and the
1ih day of November, 2010, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did with
the purpose of sexually degrading and/or abusing another person, to
wit: [N.N.], did intentionally disseminate, publish or sell any image or

For purposes of this appeal, the alleged victim and her husband are referred to herein
by initial rather than by first and last name.
1
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images of the intimate areas of [N.N.] without the consent of [N.N.] and
with the knowledge that the sexual images would sexually abuse or
degrade her.
(R., p.6.)

At the preliminary hearing, the State presented the testimony of three witnesses.
First, the State presented the testimony of N.N.'s husband, T.N., who initially discovered
the video of N.N. on the internet when he was alerted to it through an acquaintance.
(Prelim. Tr., p.3, L.8 - p.5, L.16.) T.N. testified that Mr. McLellan and N.N. had two
children in common, and T.N. and N.N. were in the process of seeking custody of these
children at the time T.N. discovered the video. (Prelim. Tr., pA, L.5 - p.5, L.10.) After
T.N. did a search for his wife's name on an internet search engine, he testified that
there were links to numerous web sites with videos linked to them.

(Prelim. Tr., p.5,

L.21 - p.6, L.?)
T.N. testified that he investigated these web sites. (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.)
Apparently, on some of the web sites there were text posts that referenced both N.N.
and T.N., and which contained "vulgarities" and references to "the use of drugs" and
undisclosed sexual matters.2 (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.16-24.) In addition to the text posts,
T.N. testified that there were three different videos that he saw: two involved depictions
of N.N. using drugs, and one involved "nudity of her." (Prelim. Tr., p.?, Ls.18-24.)
Regarding the single video allegedly depicting N.N. while naked, T.N. described
the video as N.N. "undressing for the camera." (Prelim. Tr., p.?, L.25 - p.8, L.6.) This
film included "very strange noises" in the background and was edited so that script

2 Neither the specific content of the text posts, nor direct evidence of these posts
themselves, were ever provided to the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. (See
Prelim. Tr., generally.)
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appeared over the video at the end of the film that stated, "fuck you, cunt." (Prelim.
Tr., p.B, Ls.2-6.)

According to TN.'s testimony, this video displayed N.N.'s breasts,

genitals, and buttocks. (Prelim. Tr., p.B, Ls.7-13.)
After viewing this video, TN. contacted an attorney in an attempt to figure out
how to get the videos taken down or removed from the web sites where they had been
posted.

(Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.1-11.) The next day, TN. and N.N. contacted the Ada

County Sheriff's Office. (Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.12-1B.)
The State next presented the testimony of N.N.

She testified that she and

Mr. McLellan had been in a dating relationship for just over two years, and had two
children in common.

(Prelim. Tr., p.13, Ls.7-24.)

N.N. admitted that she had no

personal recollection of making any videos with Mr. McLellan in which she appeared
naked. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.B-10.) She further testified that she learned that there was
such a video of her when her husband called her and told her about the web sites.
(Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.11-19.)
N.N. testified that she examined the web sites where there were videos of her
posted. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, L.20 - p.15, L.1B.) She discovered videos that depicted her
naked, although N.N. could not recall whether her breasts were exposed in them.
(Prelim. Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25.)

According to her testimony, there were captions

associated with this video that used derogatory language towards her - referring to her
as a crack whore and a lying bitch. (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.1-B.) N.N testified that she
only made one video in which she was naked on one occasion, but that she never gave
Mr. McLellan permission to publish this video.

(Prelim. Tr., p.16, L.17 - p.17, L.6.)

Although N.N. described the video of her naked as showing "intimate areas of her body,
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she did not provide further elaboration as to the contents of the video.

(Prelim.

Tr., p.18, Ls.3-6.)
The final witness for the State was Detective Charles Lebar, who was involved in
the investigation of N.N. and T.N.'s report to police.

(Prelim. Tr., p.21, L.17 - p.22,

L.20.) As part of this investigation, the detective interviewed Mr. McLellan.
Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6.)

(Prelim.

According to Detective Lebar, Mr. McLellan admitting to having

posted the video, allegedly because he was upset with N.N. due to the child custody
dispute they were having.

(Prelim. Tr., p.23, Ls.16-25.)

Based on this admission,

Detective Lebar secured a search warrant for Mr. McLellan's computer.

(Prelim.

Tr., p.24, Ls.1-3.)
The detective testified that Mr. McLellan made further admissions during the
execution of this warrant.

(Prelim. Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9.)

Specifically, Mr. McLellan

allegedly admitted to posting the video to several web sites and stated that he had done
so because he was upset at N.N. (Prelim. Tr., p.25, L.8 - p.26, L.6.) The detective
then obtained a video off of Mr. McLellan's computer. (Prelim. Tr., p.25, L.17 - p.26,
L.9.)
This video was approximately two and one-half minutes long in total and
apparently had three segments - only one of which involved any alleged naked
depictions of N.N. The first portion was merely scrolling text on the screen that included
N.N.'s name and various derogatory terms. (Prelim. Tr., p.26, Ls.10-24.) The second
portion, according to the officer, showed a woman who appeared to be N.N. "smoking
something from aluminum foil." (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.1-4.) After another text segment,
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the final portion of this video displayed a woman - who also appeared to be N.N. undressing in front of the camera. (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.5-10.)
The officer testified regarding this portion of the video that the woman's entire
naked body was exposed. (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.11-13.) Detective Lebar also testified
that the woman in the video looked at the camera several times, so the detective
believed that this person was aware that the camera was there while removing her
clothes. (Prelim. Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.)
The magistrate, at the close of the State's evidence, was troubled by the
absence of any evidence regarding Mr. McLellan's intent at the time the video of N.N.
disrobing was initially obtained. (Prelim. Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.36, L.21.) The State argued
in response to the magistrate's concerns that the images of N.N. were not "obtained"
until the images were later edited by Mr. McLellan. (Prelim. Tr., p.33, L.3 - p.34, L.2.)
Despite the court's expressed misgivings about the absence of proof regarding the
intent element, the magistrate held that, "the broader approach that's urged by the State

is probably sufficient for this purpose," and found that there was probable cause for the
offense as charged by the State. (Prelim. Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.36, L.21; R., pp.24-25.)
Thereafter, the State filed its Information.

(R., pp.26-27.)

As with its initial

criminal complaint, the State's allegation of video voyeurism was limited to the
allegation that Mr. McLellan had knowledge that the images of N.N.'s intimate areas
were obtained solely with the intent to "sexually abuse or degrade her." (R., pp.26-27.)
Mr. McLellan then filed a motion to dismiss the State's Information based upon
the insufficiency of the State's evidence to establish probable cause for the charged
offense. (R., pp.47-51.) Specifically, Mr. McLellan asserted that the State's evidence
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was insufficient to establish that he had the intent to sexually abuse or degrade N.N. at
the time that he initially obtained the images of her intimate areas. (R., pp.50-51.)
The State objected to this motion. (R., pp.60-63.) In its objection to this motion,
the State expressly acknowledged that the sole intent upon which its charge was
predicated with regard to the obtaining of the images was, "the purpose of sexually
degrading or abusing any other person." (R., p.61.) However, the State reiterated its
position that Mr. McLellan did not obtain the images of N.N.'s intimate areas until after
he had made edits to those images by adding additional text to them. (R., pp.60-63.)
The district court granted Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss. (Tr., pA, LA - p.6,
L.16; R., pp.66-70.) In its written order granting this motion, the district court specifically
noted that the State's sole allegation regarding the knowledge and intent requirement
for its allegation of video voyeurism was that Mr. McLellan had "the purpose of sexually
degrading or abusing" N.N. (R., p.68.) The court also found that this intent must have
existed at the time the images were obtained. (R., p.69.)
As a factual finding, the district court determined that the images of N.N.'s
intimate areas were obtained during the course of Mr. McLellan's relationship with N.N.
between 2004 and 2007.

(R., p.69.)

The court implicitly found that there was no

evidence that Mr. McLellan harbored the purpose of sexually abusing or degrading N.N.
at the time the video was made during the course of their prior relationship. (R., pp.6970.)

Accordingly, the court granted Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss the State's

information. (R., p.70.)
The State timely appealed from the district court's order granting Mr. McLellan's
motion to dismiss. (R., p.71.)

7

ISSUE
Has the State failed to establish that the district court erred when it granted
Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss the State's information due to a lack of probable cause
to support the offense charged?

8

ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It Granted
Mr. McLellan's Motion To Dismiss The State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable
Cause To Support The Offense Charged

A.

Introduction
Mr. McLellan asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate that the district

court abused its discretion in granting his motion to dismiss the State's information
based upon the failure of the State to establish probable cause for every element of the
charged offense.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard upon review of a district

court's determination regarding a motion to dismiss. State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184185 (2002); State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, _

Idaho _ , 275 P.3d 1, 4 (2012). "When a

district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the Court determines
whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) reached its decision through the
exercise of reason." Martinez-Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 4. When reviewing a finding of
probable cause, this Court defers to the findings of fact of the lower court that are
supported by substantial evidence, but this Court reviews de novo whether those facts
as found constitute probable cause.

Id.

In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de

novo. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176,177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a
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construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v.
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v.
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. McLellan's Motion To Dismiss The
State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause

1.

The Determination Of Whether There Exists Probable Cause To Support
The State's Charged Offense Is Limited To The Actual Charge Alleged By
The State In Its Complaint, And There Was Insufficient Evidence To
Support A Finding Of Probable Cause For The Offense Of Video
Voyeurism As Alleged By The State In This Case

In this case, the State in both its initial criminal complaint and its Information
charged Mr. McLellan with video voyeurism pursuant to I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). (R., pp.56, 26-27.) The entirety of this statutory provision provides that:
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions of such
person or another person, or for his own or another person's
lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the
purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any other person:
(b) He intentionally disseminates, publishes or sells any image or
images of the intimate areas of another person or persons without
the consent of such other person or persons and with the
knowledge that such image or images were obtained with the
intent set forth above.
I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b) (emphasis added).
Under the plain language of the statute, the State was required in this case to
establish both that Mr. McLellan had the requisite intent at the time of allegedly
disseminating or publishing images of the intimate areas of N.N., and that he had
knowledge that the images of N.N. were initially obtained with that intent as well.
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There are three alternate intents set forth by statute: (1) the intent of arousing,
appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions of the defendant or another person; (2) the
intent of satisfying his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction
of prurient interest; and (3) the intent of sexually degrading or abusing another person.
I.C. § 18-6609(2). While there are three alternate intents that may sustain a charge of
video voyeurism, the State in this case only alleged one of these intents in both its
criminal complaint and the subsequent Information: that Mr. McLellan had the intent to
sexually abuse and degrade N.N. both at the time of publishing or disseminating the
images of her and at the time of obtaining these images. (R., pp.5-6, 26-27.)
The State's entire argument as to why this Court should overturn the district
court's determination that the State did not establish probable cause as to the offense
as charged by the State is reliant upon one central premise - that the district court
should have ignored the manner in which the State alleged Mr. McLellan had committed
video voyeurism within its complaint, and that the district court should have instead
sought out an alternate theory upon which the State's charge could have been
sustained within the governing statute. The State argues solely that the magistrate's
probable cause determination should have been upheld based on a finding of an intent
other than that alleged by the State, i.e., the intent of "arousing, appealing to or
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of [himself] or another person, or for his
own or another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest."
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 0.)
While the State is correct insofar as these are two of the three intents that may
support a charge of video voyeurism, the State never alleged either of these two intents
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in support of its charge in the criminal complaint or information in this case. (R., pp.5-6,
24-27.)

Despite the fact that the prosecutor had elected to proceed solely on the

allegation that Mr. McLellan had the intent of sexually degrading or abusing N.N. at the
time he obtained the images of her intimate parts, the State is now seeking on appeal to
have this Court look beyond the State's own allegations in order to find probable cause.
(Appellant's Brief, p.12 ("The district court erred by requiring the State to establish
probable cause to believe that McLellan knew the images of [N.N.] were obtained with
only the intent to sexually degrade or sexually abuse her.").)
In the section of the argument where the State advances this claim, the State
notably cites to no authority at all to support this proposition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1112.) Because the State as the Appellant in this case has failed to support its arguments
on appeal with any legal authority, this Court should decline to entertain the merits of
the State's assertion that the district court was required to seek out an alternate legal
theory, other than that presented in the State's criminal complaint, in order to find
probable cause for the State's charge. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
In addition, this claim is markedly different than that presented to the district
court. The State's argument before the district court was limited to the claim that the
images of N.N.'s intimate areas were not obtained until Mr. McLellan edited these
images to include text, and that he had the intent to sexually abuse or degrade her at
that time. (R., pp.60-63.) The State makes no contention in this appeal that the images
of N.N.'s intimate areas were obtained when Mr. McLellan made edits to those images,
or that Mr. McLellan had the intent to sexually abuse or degrade N.N. at the time the
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images were obtained - and rightly

SO.3

(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-12.) In fact, it would

appear to be logically impossible for these images to have been edited or altered by
Mr. McLellan prior to them actually being obtained by him.
"The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are
presented for the first time on appeal." State v. Gertsch, 137 Idaho 387, 395 (2002)
(quoting State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 529 (1993)).

Because the State, as the

Appellant in this case, failed to raise the claims now relied upon in this appeal to the trial
court with regard to Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss, Mr. McLellan asserts that the
State has not preserved its claims for this Court's review.
However, even if this Court is inclined to entertain the merits of this claim, the
State's argument appears to be contrary to the legal standards attendant on a district
court's review for whether the State has established probable cause for the charged
offense.

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 governs preliminary hearings, and requires in

pertinent part that a magistrates finding of probable cause, "shall be based upon
substantial evidence upon every material element of the offense charged."

I.C.R.

5.1 (b) (emphasis added). Therefore, under the plain terms of this rule, the measure of
whether probable cause has been established is based upon the offense as it has been

3 Although the State's position on when the images of N.N.'s intimate areas were
obtained by Mr. McLellan is not expressly set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the State
does discuss the obtaining of these images in conjunction with the point in time where
the video of her removing her clothing was initially made, and proceeds to argue error
with regard to the district court's ruling, "[a]ssuming the images of [N.N.'s] body were
'obtained' at the time she was video-taped naked." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 12.) The
State has likewise not challenged, on appeal, the district court's factual finding that, "the
evidence is clear that the Defendant obtained the images during his relationship with
[N.N.] between 2004 and 2007." (R., p.69; see also Appellant's Brief, generally.)
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charged by the State - it is not whether the magistrate believes that any offense has
been committed.
This is consistent with case law regarding the legal standards governing probable
cause determinations at preliminary hearings. In order to establish probable cause, the
State bears the burden to establish that a crime was committed and that there is
probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370,
372 (Ct. App. 2003). However, case law regarding whether probable cause has been
established consistently roots the standards for this determination with regard to the
"offense charged" by the State. Id.; see also State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57 (1983).
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Stewart recently discussed the relationship
between the probable cause determination rendered at a preliminary hearing and the
criminal complaint upon which such determination must be made. See State v. Stewart,
149 Idaho 383, 387-388 (2010). As explained by Stewart, it is the filing of the criminal
complaint that commences a legal action. Id. at 387; see also I.C.R. 3. The effect of a
waiver of a preliminary hearing is to "waive the right to a probable cause determination
regarding the charged felony."

Stewart, 149 Idaho at 387 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the function of a preliminary hearing is to require review by an independent
magistrate to determine whether the State's particular allegation of criminal activity
meets the evidentiary standard of probable cause.
In this case, the State admittedly only charged Mr. McLellan with video
voyeurism under the theory that he had obtained the video images of N.N.'s intimate
areas with the intent to sexually abuse and degrade her, and that he had knowledge
that the video was obtained with this intent.
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The evidence in this case shows that

Mr. McLellan obtained the images of N.N.'s intimate areas during the course of his prior
dating relationship with N.N. The aspects of the video alleged to have been abusive or
degrading towards N.N. were not present until well after this time. Mr. McLellan submits
that the district court did not err when it determined that the State did not provide
sufficient evidence with regard to the intent element as charged by the State, and,
accordingly, the district court did not err in granting his motion to dismiss the State's
Info rmation.

2.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish Probable Cause For The
Offense Of Video Voyeurism Under Any Of The Alternate Theories Of
Liability Not Alleged By The State

Mr. McLellan also asserts that, under any of the possible intents enumerated in
I.C. § 18-6609(2), the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause as to his intent at the time the images of N.N.'s intimate areas were obtained.
In this case, the State made a critical omission in the presentation of evidence in
support of its charge - the State failed to present the actual video itself which was the
subject of the State's video voyeurism allegation. While such an omission might not be
automatically fatal for the State's claims with regard to establish the intent at the time
the video was obtained, this omission coupled with the absence of any meaningful
description of the context for the naked images of N.N., and the absence of any
evidence at all of the surrounding circumstances regarding the taking of the video, left
both the magistrate and the district court without any evidence upon which to base a
finding of probable cause as to the intent of the person who took this video at the time it
was made.
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The sum total of the relevant information regarding the nature of this video as it
related to the intent element is as follows.4 T.N. testified at the preliminary hearing that
the video depicted N.N., "undressing for the camera," to the point where her breasts,
vagina, and buttocks were displayed.

(Prelim. Tr., p.?, L.25 - p.8, L.13.) T.N. also

stated that "very strange noises" could be heard in the background, but did not
elaborate as to what he meant by this description, and so the nature of these "strange"
noises remained a mystery. (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.2-6.)
N.N. testified that the video underlying the State's charge depicted her naked,
and showed what she would describe as intimate areas of her body, but did not provide
any specifics as to the contents of this video and further could not recall whether her
breasts were exposed on the video.

(Prelim. Tr., p.14, L.11 - p.18, L.6.)

Finally,

Detective Lebar only testified that the video depicted a female undressing while
occasionally looking at the camera, and that the video displayed her entire naked body.5
(Prelim. Tr., p.27, L.2 - p.29, L.3.)

4 While the State's witnesses testified as to text that was apparently overlaid onto the
video images, such an overlay would be part of the editing process of the video
subsequent to the images of nudity themselves being "obtained" by filming N.N. as she
removed her clothing. (See Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.2-18.) Idaho Code § 18-6609(2)(b)
requires that the images of the intimate areas be disseminated, published or sold "with
the knowledge that such image or images were obtained with the intent set forth above."
I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). Thus, the statutorily required intent must exist at the time the
images of intimate areas are initially obtained, not when the images may be
subsequently modified or subjected to editing. Accordingly, Mr. McLellan's alleged
"intent" at the time of allegedly editing this video after the fact is not relevant to this
Court's review, as I.C. § 18-6609 is limited only to the defendant's intent at the time of
initially obtaining the images as an element of the offense. See I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b).
5 The State alleged in its objection to Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss that the
videotape at issue also showed N.N. masturbating. (R., p.60.) However, there is
absolutely no evidence to substantiate this in the record.
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Contrary to the State's assertion in this appeal, the mere fact that a video depicts
an image of a woman - who is aware of the presence of the camera - removes her
clothing while being filmed to the point where she is completely naked does not ipso
facto establish any of the specific intents required under I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b).

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12.) This reading would actually treat as a nullity or as mere
surplusage the requirement that the images depicted be of the "intimate areas" of a
person in addition to the images being obtained with a particular intent. See I.C. § 186609(2)(b).

The statute itself defines "intimate areas" as "the buttocks, genitals or

genital areas of males or females, and the breast area of females."

I.C. § 18-

6609(2)(a)(d). If it were enough to merely show that the person depicted in the images
lacked clothing in order to establish the intent to gratify "some type of sexual appetite,"
which is the State's contention in this appeal, then the additional specific intent
requirement in this statute is rendered mere surplusage.

Accordingly, because a

depiction of nudity is already required to sustain the element that the image or images
be of an "intimate area," the additional intent element for video voyeurism necessarily
requires evidence beyond mere proof that the images involved nudity.
Mr. McLellan acknowledges that circumstantial evidence may, at times, be
sufficient to demonstrate intent in absence of direct proof.

See Reyes, 139 Idaho at

506. However, in this case there was also no evidence regarding the circumstances
surrounding the taking of this video that could have bridged the State's evidentiary gap.
The sole person who testified at the preliminary hearing who was present when the film
was allegedly taken or obtained by Mr. McLellan was N.N. And, by her own account,
she had no memory of this video being taken at all. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.8-10.)

17

As has been noted, this Court interprets statutes so as to give effect to every
word and phrase within the statute and to avoid treating any of the terms within the
statute as mere surplusage. Bradbury, 149 Idaho at 116; Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177.
The mere fact that a video was obtained that depicts a woman undressing to the point
of nakedness does not, of itself, demonstrate that this image was initially obtained "with
the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of
such person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious
entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the purpose of sexually
degrading or abusing another person." See I.C. § 18-6609(2).

Nor can such proof

establish knowledge of the fact of such intent at the time of obtaining such an image.
See I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b).
The State's argument to the contrary would render the language of I.C. § 186609(2) that requires such an intent mere surplusage, since this intent is required in
addition to proof that the defendant obtained an image or images of the intimate areas
of a person.

Because the State never presented the video underpinning the State's

allegation of video voyeurism, presented no testimony as to the circumstances
surrounding the making of this video, and only presented evidence that the video
depicted a woman removing her clothes for the camera, Mr. McLellan submits that the
district court correctly found insufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding as
to the requisite intent for a charge of video voyeurism. Accordingly, Mr. McLellan asks
that this Court affirm the district court's order granting his motion to dismiss the State's
information in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. McLellan asks that this Court affirm the district court's order dismissing the State's
information.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2012.

SjX AH E. TOM
JDeputy State Appellate Public Defender
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